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Finding a Basis for International Communications Law:
The Satellite Broadcast Example
Lizbeth Hasse*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE LACK OF AN INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNICATION LAW
Freedom of information is not a well-established concept in an interna-
tional law context. An international human right to receive and con-
vey information is perhaps universally recognized. But, limitations on
the right, its scope and its priority vary sharply from country to country.
The basic U.N. articulation of the "right" is contained in Article 19 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which provides that
"[e]veryone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, re-
ceive and impart information and ideas through any media and regard-
less of frontiers."' Numerous U.N. and UNESCO resolutions reaffirm
Article 19, as do most of the important human rights documents adopted
by the U.N. General Assembly in the last 50 years.2 As this article
points out, the broad language of Article 19 and the general areas of
concern it sets out provide little direct guidance as to the acceptability or
the illegitimacy of any particular kind of regulation of expressive activity.
Nor does the Declaration give any clue as to what the appropriate re-
* Hasse and Associates, Berkeley and San Francisco, California; Of Counsel, Duane, Lyman &
Seltzer, Berkeley, California; J.D., Boalt Hall School of Law University of California, Berkeley,
1982; M.A. Jurisprudence & Social Policy Department, University of California, Berkeley, 1982.
1 G. A. Res. 217, 3 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 13) at 71, 74-75 (art. 19), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)
[hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights]. See also, BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 135 (I. Brownlie ed. 1967). This declaration is not a legally binding instrument. Still,
some of its provisions amount to general principles of law. See, for example, the statute of the
International Court of Justice, Article 38 (I)(c). Its important function is as an authoritative guide,
as produced by the General Assembly of the United Nations, to the interpretation of the U.N.
Charter. As such, the declaration of human rights has much indirect legal effect and has been con-
sidered by the U.N. Assembly and many international law commentators as an important part of
international law. For discussions of the status of the declaration of human rights see, H. LAUTER-
PACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 1950; McDougal and Bebr, Human Rights in
the United Nations, 58 AM. J. OF INT. L. 603 (1964).
2 See, eg., UNESCO Constitution (Preamble and Article I) (enacted November 16, 1945, effec-
tive November 4, 1946); American Convention on Human Rights (Article 13) (Inter-American Con-
ference on Human Rights, San Jos6, Costa Rica, November 22, 1969); European Convention on
Human Rights (Article 10), enacted November 4, 1950, effective September 3, 1953.
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sponse by the international community or some law-enforcing body
should be to a particular violation. One way in which a provision may be
given substantive interpretation is by each adherents drawing on its own
internal principles, rules and traditions governing communication and
expression. Obviously, this would lead to a diversity of interpretations
and, inevitably as communications become more and more transnational,
disputes over the limits of restrictions of transnational broadcast and
reception.
A consequence of such diversity in the approaches to these disputes
is that in order to arrive at a consensus on the issue, the law must be so
fragmented or compromised as to sap it of most of its substance. A case
in point is international copyright protection, where in the absence of a
treaty the general approach is not an actual internationalization of the
law, but a piecemeal procedure that applies to foreigners not in residence
there. If, and only if an alien's country provides copyright protection
and that alien complied with his own country's formalities, then copy-
right is granted to one alien on the terms that it is granted to a citizen,
not on the terms of the alien's country.3
In theory, there are two general approaches to creating an interna-
tional regulation which takes into account the differences in the national
laws of those consenting to it. One procedure would be to international-
ize a minimum standard as the agreed common standard. The other
would be to allow various parties to the agreement to make exceptions
regarding specific points with which they disagree. This second ap-
proach, while it must be faulted for the lack of uniformity it would pro-
mote, would permit the setting of higher standards, on the proviso that in
specific circumstances specified parties can avoid them. Depending on
the field which the proposed international law is designed to regulate,
one approach or the other may be more desirable. Clearly, if the field
subject to the regulation is regarded as a matter of basic human rights,
there is both genuine need for the firm establishment of a "lowest com-
mon denominator" and, at the same time, less likelihood that parties will
permit or tolerate exceptions to the "basic" right by other participating
countries. Thus, the issue of whether freedom of expression or free flow
of information laws should be uniform but minimal, or more substantial
but varied in their application is the subject for another, more in depth,
discussion.
At the national level in American law, where the concept of freedom
of expression - whether embodied as a right, privilege or limitation on
3 See Tannenbaum, The Principle of National Treatment in UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVEN-
TION ANALYZED 13 (T. Kupferman & M. Foner ed. 1955). The Universal Copyright Convention
("UCC") makes a step toward "internationalization" by excusing any author's noncompliance with




state action - is well developed and given high priority as a concept it
nonetheless remains abstract.4 The abstract simplicity of the idea set out
in a constitutional provision as "the freedom of speech" is to be con-
trasted with the complexity of the legal rules and cases applying it. That
is, the provision expresses the "freedom" in simple and absolute form -
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech"5 -
but, put into practice, this "freedom" encompasses a large variety of re-
strictions on speech and other forms of expression all of which form the
body of "free speech" law. A few of its more familiar components in-
clude: obscenity prohibitions,6 restrictions on ownership of multiple or-
gans of communication,7 copyright restrictions on performance and
duplication,8 restrictions in the name of national security on the access to
information, 9 privacy,"0 libel and defamation limitations."1 In spite of
the remarkable difference between the simplicity of the formulation of
the constitutional basis for this qualitatively protected "freedom" and the
elaborate complex of legal structures implementing this protection, it is
not an over-generalization to say that Americans seem content with the
simplistic formulation, that, while there may be disputes in practice
about where to draw limits on the limitations on expressive activity, eve-
ryone seems to know just what someone is appealing to when the "free-
dom of speech" or the "free flow of information" is invoked as support
for engaging in an activity. On the American domestic front, in the com-
plicated interplay of simple provision and elaborate implementation, the
force of the simple phrase is not lost.
That the formulation of the concept can be left as unspecified as it is
4 For discussions of the "priority of speech," see Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 Nw.
U.L. REv. 1284 (1983); Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982); Baker,
Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978). For an in depth
consideration of how the "abstract" concept of the freedom of speech encompasses specific kinds of
protection of which there is a shared understanding in the United States, see Z. CHAFEE, FREE
SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941). See also Chafee, Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891,
897-900 (1949).
5 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6 U.S. v. Pryba, 674 F. Supp. 1518 (E.D. Va. 1987) (obscenity test requires judgment of mate-
rial as a whole, not just excerpts).
7 News America Pub., Inc. v. F.C.C., 844 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (constitutionality of an
extension of waiver to newspaper owner who held television broadcast license).
8 Gero v. Seven-Up Co., 535 F. Supp. 212 (E.D. N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 714 F.2d 113 (distinction
between free flow of ideas and embodiment of ideas accommodate conflicting interests of First
Amendment and copyright laws).
9 U.S. v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (restrictions on
former CIA officer's publication of classified information).
10 Ranchos La Costa v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 106 Cal. App. 3d 646, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 347 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 902 (privacy is paramount to free speech when defendant
makes defamatory lie invading privacy).
I" Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1490 (D.D.C. 1987) (context will determine
whether libel or slander will be considered privileged as statement of opinion).
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and, yet, apparently, both serve its protective purpose and permit the
development of an array of detailed and workable rules about kinds of
expression and limitations on them is testament to the degree to which an
understanding of the constitutional phrase is shared within one particu-
lar national realm.
II. EXPANDING COMMUNICATION FIELD CALLS FOR THE CREATION
OF A COHESIVE BODY OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNICATIONS LAW
As communications, both in their reach and their means, become
generally transnational, the lack of an integrated transnational communi-
cations law becomes all the more apparent. Furthermore, the possibility
of a multiplicity of disputes over the use of highly sophisticated and pow-
erful communications technology which, on an international communi-
cations basis, may effectively erase national boundaries becomes all the
more real. On a transnational scale, it is only in the last few years that
communications and information policy have developed as issues per se.
This recent phenomenon is partly the result of actual and promised tech-
nological advances in transnational satellite and cable broadcasting.12 If
12 Not surprisingly, advances in satellite communications technology have outstripped the laws
designed to regulate its use. See, e.g., Note, Law in a Vacuum: The Common Heritage Doctrine in
Outer Space Law, 7 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 403, 410-12 (1984). The basis for international
communications law, to the extent it exists as a body of law, was The International Telegraph Con-
vention ("Telegraph Convention"), established by 20 nations in 1865. The Telegraph Convention
was the ancestor of the International Telecommunications Union ("ITU"), formed in 1932, largely
because of transnational disputes over the distribution of radio frequencies. See, e.g., Jakhu, The
Evolution of The ITU's Regulatory Regime Governing Space Radiocommunication Services and Geos-
tationary Satellite Orbit, in 8 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE LAW 381, 381-83 (1983). Because the ITU's
purpose was formulated in very general terms, its concerns encourage satellite as well as radio broad-
cast. As the 1973 mandate declares, "with a view to harmonizing the development of telecommuni-
cations facilities, notably those using space technologies, with a view to the full advantage being
taken of their possibilities." International Telecommunication Convention, Oct. 25, 1973, art. 4,
para. 2(c), 28 U.S.T. 2495, 2512, T.I.A.S. No. 8572 [hereinafter "Telecommunications Conven-
tion"]. The Telecommunications Convention regulates both frequency allocation and assignment of
geostationary satellite positions among its members. Id. at 2518.
It must be acknowledged that the ITU has had to keep up, not only with new forms of broad-
cast technology, but with the new possibilities for communications events, that the new technologies
create, i.e. simultaneous ("space-bridge") television broadcasts, instant information transfer and ex-
change systems, private links between personal computers, teleconferencing in all areas between
scientific labs, hospitals, political bodies, geographically remote areas, etc. Rapid technological ad-
vances and the relatively stagnant nature of the law means that the technology may often encourage,
or at least allow, an evasion of current law. For example, media organizations with access to satel-
lites or satellite photos have the capacity to obtain photos of places where photography is restricted
by law. The country with the restrictions cannot readily enforce them against satellite photography,
nor does one nation have much capacity to guard electronically transmitted data or to keep other
nations from eavesdropping on electronically stored information. On this topic, see U.S. CONGRESS,
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COMMERCIAL NEWSGATHERING FROM SPACE: A TECHNI-
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the solution to the regulatory infancy of this field is to develop a body of
communications law - embracing many of the aspects which developed
domestic communications law takes into account, i.e., copyright and li-
censing, allocation of frequencies, free speech and free flow of informa-
tion issues, access issues, national security, obscenity, libel and
defamation and "fighting words" kinds of restraints - those attempting
to establish such a body of international communications law will have to
consider: 1) that the diversity of treatment of communication access to
and availability of information and technology capacities between differ-
ent countries means that transnationalization of communications law
cannot be achieved by a simple expansion of national-based regulation; 2)
that, again because of this diversity, the piecemeal production of interna-
tional communications agreements and projects on a contract by con-
tract basis 'between particular countries with different practices,
principles and levels of technological development, the individual nature
of which has characterized many transnational telecommunications ven-
tures to date, may spawn more problems that it avoids; 3) that any devel-
opments in the international law of communications must entail a
probing examination of philosophical underpinnings of different nations'
treatment of technological and communications innovation. In short,
one cannot expect that an international communications law can be con-
stituted by domestic communications law writ large.
The basic differences between law in the international arena and law
within the domestic realm go beyond the lack of means of enforcement at
the international level or the problems of creating a recognized and au-
thoritative law-making body. Far deeper is the more substantive prob-
lem of determining what the scope of that law should be; what values
should it protect, what values and interests have priority, what kinds of
matters should the law regulate, and when does legal regulation become
overly intrusive. These concerns are more pronounced when the matter
to be regulated is as culturally specific as information and expressive
behavior.
To ignore the fundamental difference between the international and
national scope of any law which is potentially transnational in effect and
particularly of laws regulating the free flow of information is to risk cre-
ating domestic regulations that make domestic sense and international
nonsense. Illustrative of just this kind of tunnel-visioned law-making are
the U.S. regulations known as the Land Remote-Sensing Communication
Act of 1987 issued by the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Ad-
ministration governing licensing and access of the media and other enti-
CAL MEMORANDUM (1987); Broad, Private Cameras in Space Stir U.S. Security Fears, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 25, 1987, at C1, col. 3.
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ties to communications satellites and the information they produce. 13
III. THE EXAMPLE OF FEDERAL REGULATION OF LAND REMOTE-
SENSING SATELLITES: DOMESTIC REGULATION OF AN
INTERNATIONAL PHENOMENON
The Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984 autho-
rizes private U.S. media to launch land remote-sensing satellites and au-
thorizes private media use of nonmilitary U.S. government satellites as
they are available. 4 Land remote-sensing satellites contain radiation
scanners which detect electromagnetic radiation as it is reflected off the
earth's surface and relay the measurement of this radiation to a satellite
ground station which in turn encodes the measurements of radiation as
computer images. The quality of the product is dependent not only upon
the position of the satellite but also upon atmospheric conditions; clouds
and smog can obscure the surface or interfere with detection of radiation.
Satellites travel in polar orbits and take approximately 100 minutes to
circle the globe. As the earth rotates and satellites travel consistently in a
pole-to-pole orbit, they cover different parts of the globe during each or-
bit. For the private media, land remote-sensing satellites, though as yet
of questionable reliability, offer access to information which is often un-
obtainable by any other means. For example, views of the Afghan con-
flict of refugee camps in remote parts of Ethiopia. But, while the land
remote-sensing satellites offer interesting possibilities for pictorial infor-
mation gathering, federal NOAA Land Remote Sensing Commercializa-
tion Act which governs their use and by private parties give little
indication as to how the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Com-
merce, who are the authorized parties, will evaluate applications by the
private media for exploitation of remote-sensing satellites and informa-
tion gathered thereby in general public broadcasts.
The Act does not explicitly indicate the extent to which the private
media will be allowed to use images generated by the satellites, but, in-
stead, governs the granting and denial of licenses and access. The Act
largely addresses national security concerns as public policy considera-
tions. That is, while it establishes the possibility for private parties to
participate in the use of, or indeed launch their own remote-sensing satel-
lites, the bulk of the interests mentioned in the regulations as guides for
implementation of the Act involve national security or foreign policy fac-
tors. For example, in citing the purposes of the Act, the regulations set
out to "maintain the United States' worldwide leadership in civil remote-
sensing, preserve its national security, and fulfill its international obliga-
13 Land Remote-Sensing Communication Act of 1987, 52 Fed. Reg. § 25970-74 (1980) (codi-
fied at 15 C.F.R. § 960).
14 15 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4292 (1988).
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tions."' 5 The Act requires that the Secretary of Commerce, in granting
or reviewing applications for licenses under the Act or considering any
specific satellite use under the Act, consult with the Secretaries of De-
fense and of State who are directed to determine whether national secur-
ity, foreign policy or international interests are affected by the proposed
uses. 6 Constitutional or other free expression or free flow of information
issues are not raised in the Act as factors to be considered in the applica-
tion process or other implementation procedures. The major require-
ment of applicants for licenses and other uses is that they provide
operational information regarding their remote-sensing space systems on
which the Secretary of Commerce may base review to insure compliance
with "any applicable international obligations and national security con-
cerns of the United States."1 7 While the Act puts no limit on the number
of remote-sensing satellite systems that may be licensed to private appli-
cants,'" it also provides that licenses are to be granted on a "space-avail-
able basis." 19 Yet, the Act does not give the Departments of Commerce,
State or Defense any guidelines for assigning priorities in distribution of
licenses when the space available is limited. The lack of direction for
resolving this technical problem will almost inevitably raise constitu-
tional issues including how to allocate resources on a nondiscriminatory
and content-neutral basis so as not to raise charges of unconstitutional
favoritism or other interference in the "freedom of speech." Most re-
vealing of the extent to which the Act ignores first amendment issues is a
provision in a recent proposed rulemaking on the Licensing of Private-
Sensing Space Systems raising the following issue: that "individual judg-
ments [regarding the granting or denial of license or of the limitations
imposed in consideration of national security or international obligations
are] made in a context affected by rapidly changing technology and must
be made on a case-by-case basis."2 °
Because satellite systems are expensive 1 , access or ownership is not
Is Id. § 4202(2).
16 Id. § 4277(a)(b).
17 Id. § 4241(b).
18 Id. §§ 4241-4244.
19 Id. § 4245(a).
20 51 Fed. Reg. 9971-9973 (1986).
21 The cost factor, too, changes with the technology. In 1964, when INTELSAT was estab-
lished, a "single global system" was the most cost-effective design because the costs of developing a
separate global satellite system was prohibitive for one or a small group of nations. Today, with the
variety of services that are transmitted by satellite - from banking to information exchange to
electronic mail - no one system can meet the demand. INTELSAT uses rate-average pricing and
gives no concessions for "high-density" users, thus insuring adequate space for all members and that
large volume users subsidize less developed participants. All participants own investment shares, of
which the U.S. holds 23 percent. See Gantt, The Commercialization of Space - Twenty Years of
Experience: Some Lessons Learned, 12 J. SPACE L. 109, 117 (1984).
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
just a technological problem, but also an economic one. Thus, concerns
about distribution and access affect not only the granting of priority
among numerous applicants, but whether or not organizations with mod-
est financial means can demand access to the communication product
obtained by those who own satellites or licenses to use them. Again, this
is an issue on which the Act with its single-minded invocation of national
security concerns gives no guidance.
The lack of any expression of first amendment considerations in the
Act is remarkable in a regulation that affects such factors as fundamental
to constitutional doctrine as the content and accessibility of information.
Clearly, if Congress were to write a law that restricted the content of
telephone conversations or newspaper publications that happened to be
transmitted by satellite or limited the availability of new telephone access
to certain parties on the grounds that the telephone system utilized satel-
lite transmissions available only on a limited basis, the law would be un-
constitutional. What makes the lack of freedom of expression concerns
especially remarkable in the NOAA Remote-3 Sensing Act is the fact
that in international proposals or debates concerning the regulation of
transnational satellite transmission, the U.S. has consistently held a front
line position against any restraints on the content of satellite broadcasts
and particularly against proposals allowing for the requirement of prior
national consent before a signal could be transmitted across an interna-
tional border.2"
In this vein, it is notable that the Act fails to supply provisions that
acknowledge the international nature of satellite broadcasting and the
problems that attempts to regulate in an international realm may engen-
der. The Departments of Commerce, State and Defense are given the
authority to regulate or limit information gathering by satellite and ac-
cess to information gathered in that fashion, can they also regulate access
by domestic organizations to or the use by domestic organization of satel-
lites and material gathered by satellites which are owned or controlled by
other nations. Unlike the domestic regulations set out in the statute,
which govern the assignment of orbital space, such restrictions would not
be predicated on the availability of orbital space to the licensing body.
Thus, perhaps, under the rationale set out in the Act for controlling dis-
tribution, the government would have no power to restrict accessibility to
information gathered or the means of gathering information in an inter-
national realm. Consequentially, those U.S. organizations with access to
international satellite systems would have an advantage over those
22 See generally Control of the Direct Satellite Broadcast: Values in Conflict, in ASPEN INSTI-
TUTE PROGRAM ON COMMUNICATIONS AND SOCIETY (1974).
This collection of articles is illustrative of the U.S. position, especially the following articles: M.
Arsny, Reflections on the International Free Flow of Information, id. at 15-25; de Sola Pool, Direct
Broadcast Satellites and the Integrity of National Cultures, id. at 27-57.
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which, because of limited financial means or other limitations, did not
have the same status. This built in discriminatory consequence should
surely raise constitutional issues.
Concomitantly, to what extent should other countries' similar regu-
lations, in the interest of their national security or any other internal
interest be enforced or recognized by the U.S. government in restricting
its own citizens? And, to what extent can the U.S. hope to effectively
control the satellite information gathering activities of foreign
organizations?
IV. ATrENTION TO THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNICATIONS
What the limitations of the Land Remote-Sensing Commercializa-
tion Act most clearly affirm is that international communications law
cannot be constructed by the mere expansion of a particular system of
domestic law governing this field. The extent of conflicts inherent in
such an approach to communications law is evident in the issues that
have been raised in the international realm when different nations have
actually debated the provisions of proposed transnational communica-
tions agreements.23 United Nations resolutions expressly or implicitly
concerning direct satellite broadcasting ("DSB") provide some of the
clearest reflection of the various concerns which U.N. participants raise
in debates about regulations in the transnational communications area.
As a subject of international law and policy, DSB combines issues
raised in a number of fields - radio (frequency spectrum) communica-
tions, television broadcasting, space diplomacy and technology, and in-
formation law - the regulations of which have developed for the most
part quite independently of one another, and, if they are to be applied to
satellite broadcast problems, will have to be modified in a coherent man-
ner to handle the specificities of this cross-cultural transnational and ex-
traterrestrial communications technology. A number of the cross-
disciplinary legal issues and principles involved are collected in the
UNESCO General Conference Resolution which will be examined
here.24 There have been quite a number of UNESCO resolutions, confer-
ences and policy studies that address some aspect of transnational space
communications. I have chosen to look at this particular one, an April
19, 1980 General Conference Resolution,25 because this resolution item-
izes several of the interrelated issues and problems for which, as of yet,
no coherent body of law exists.
23 Again because of the range of issues it invokes, our example is communications satellite
regulations.
24 UNESCO Gen. Conf. Res. 4/19 (1980).
25 Id.
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The resolution begins, after reaffirmation of principles invoked in a
variety of U.N. and UNESCO agreements and declarations generally
concerning human rights, with a reiteration of Article 19 of the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights:
I. Recalling more particularly Article 19 of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights which provides that "Everyone has the right
to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom
to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and im-
part information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers" and Article 29, which stipulates that, like all others,
"These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary
to the purposes and principles of the United Nations." 26
The debates centering around free flow of information across trans-
national borders and other freedom of speech issues in the context of
high technology, particularly satellite transmission, exemplify the extent
to which Article 19 is not subject to a uniform interpretation. The
UNESCO resolution 4/19, 1980 goes on to articulate the extensively
shared principles that are meant to guide cooperation on an international
basis in the field of information and mass communication. Again, it
should be noted that the universality of the language belies the degree to
which these ideas, when put to the test of international communications
practice, are subject to much debate.
Recalling also the declaration in the Constitution of Unesco that
"the States Parties to this Constitution, believing in ...the un-
restricted pursuit of objective truth and in the free exchange of ideas
and knowledge, are agreed and determined to develop and to increase
the means of communication between their peoples and to employ
these means for the purpose of mutual understanding and a truer and
more perfect knowledge of each other's lives." 27
Already with this provision, the freedom of opinion and expression has
been somewhat qualified for the purpose of promoting understanding and
more "perfect knowledge" of others' lives. The qualification would per-
mit, for example, a distinction between information and propaganda. It
might allow restrictions on communications promoting violence or likely
to lead to misunderstandings. The next provision goes even further in
opening up possibilities for content restrictions on the "free flow of
information":
Recalling moreover that the purpose of Unesco is "to contribute
to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations
through education, science and culture in order to further universal





fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world,
without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, by the Charter of
the United Nations" (Article 1 of the Constitution).2"
The Resolution proceeds with the suggestion that a new interna-
tional order in communications and information will not promote the
interests of dominating nations, but may, by some means create a cooper-
ation among participants.
Noting the increasing attention devoted to communication
problems and needs by other intergovernmental organizations, both re-
gional and international, notably the Movement of Non-aligned Coun-
tries which, in the Declaration of the Colombo Summit (1976), stated
that "a new international order in the fields of information and mass
communications is vital as a new international economic order" and,
in the Declaration of the Havana Summit (1979), noting progress in
the development of national information media, stressed that "co-oper-
ation in the field of information is an integral part of the struggle for
the creation of new international relations in general and a new inter-
national information order in particular."
2 9
The concerns for national sovereignty and cultural identity raised in
the next section would further qualify the "free flow of information" in-
terest where communications across transnational borders may threaten
the continuation of certain cultural or national characteristics.
Conscious that communication among individuals, nations and
peoples, as well as among national minorities and different social, eth-
nic and cultural groups can and must, provided that its means are in-
creased and practices improved, make a greater contribution to
individual and collective development, the strengthening of national
and cultural identity, the consolidation of democracy and the advance-
ment of education, science and culture, as well as to the positive trans-
formation of international relations and the greater expansion of
international co-operation. 0
The task for the members is to consider communications regulations
in light of particular "circumstances"; one such circumstance is the lim-
ited supply of geostationary orbits.
Invites Member States:
(c) to take the Commission's recommendations into consideration in
the preparation and strengthening of their national communication ca-
pabilities, without losing sight of the fact that differing social, cultural
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definition and implementation of national policies and systems and to
the identification and overcoming of the obstacles to development in
the field of information and communication;
(d) to bear in mind also the fundamental need to safeguard freedom of
opinion, expression and information; to ensure that the peoples are
given the widest and most democratic access possible to the function-
ing of the mass media; and to make communication an integral part of
all development strategies;
(e) to further the development of communication infrastructures, pay-
ing special attention to the establishment of fairer telecommunication,
postal and other tariffs, and to defining a liaison with the International
Telecommunication Union and other competent organizations of the
United Nations system the conditions necessary for a more equitable
utilization of limited natural resources such as the electromagnetic
spectrum and geostationary orbits. 31
The "new international [information and mass communications] or-
der" language of the General Resolution 4/19, 1980 reflects UNESCO's
acknowledgment of the extent to which international practices and poli-
cies in the communications field based on traditional concepts of freedom
of speech and the free flow of information have recently been subject to
considerable discussion.32 The idea of creating a new international infor-
mation and mass communications order is closely linked to the develop-
ment of communications in third world countries. The creation of such a
"new order" as remarked in Part I of the Resolution is not actually es-
tablished in any U.N. document. Instead the ideas of preserving culture
and sovereignty, of promoting reciprocity and circulation of information,
of limiting obstacles to the access to the means of communication as well
as to the information itself and generally of creating a "more just and
better balanced world information and communication order"33 have
found their way into a number of U.N. documents all of which, in giving
voice to these concepts, give considerable force to concerns that are fre-
quently incompatible with U.S. constitutional doctrine or regulations.
31 Id. para. 10.
32 See Powell, Direct Broadcast Satellites: The Conceptual Convergence of the Free Flow of In-
formation and National Sovereignty, 6 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1 (1975); Hagelin, Prior Consent and the
Free Flow of Information Over International Satellite Radio and Television: A Comparison and Cri-
tique of U.S. Domestic and International Broadcasting Policy, 8 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 265
(1981); Magraw, Telecommunications: Building a Consensus, 1984 HARV. INT'L L.J. 27 (1984).
33 G. A. Res. 33/115, 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 74, U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (1978); see
also G.A. Res. 34/182, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 83, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979) (particu-
larly the preamble and part I). P. LASKIN & A. CHAYES, Control of the Direct Broadcast Satellite:




V. THE INTELSAT EXAMPLE: AN ATTEMPT TO CREATE A NEW
COMMUNICATIONS ORDER AROUND THE SAME
IRRECONCILABLE PRINCIPLES
Satellite communications are the focus here, and have received as
much attention as they have in the international communications regula-
tion discussions because, more than cable or wire transmission, satellite
overcomes the distance and topographical obstacles to communication,
and, thus, gives more play to conflicts that are international in scope.3"
Until 1985, the only means by which a U.S. common carrier could gain
access to a "global" satellite-based network was through the Communi-
cations Satellite Corporation ("COMSAT")35, the congressionally estab-
lished organization that granted access to the International Telecommu-
nications Satellite Organization ("INTELSAT"). 36 This gave COMSAT
a monopoly in the U.S. satellite broadcasting market, a monopoly only
recently eroded by limited FCC additional authorities for private interna-
tional communication systems. 37 It is estimated that in 1986 there were
approximately 80 satellites in active telecommunications use in "geosta-
tionary" (stationary over a particular spot on the earth) orbit of which
about fifty were INTELSAT satellites, about twenty-five of which were
of U.S. origin.3 The INTELSAT consortium is made up of about 110
member nations that share the system of telecommunications satellites
and earthbound receiving stations. The allocation problems that led to
the 1971 establishment of INTELSAT to monitor the distribution of ac-
cess to the communications satellites was, in principle, not new. INTEL-
SAT draws on the model and some of the concerns of the International
Telecommunications Union of 1932 ("ITU") to regulate problems asso-
ciated with the allocation of radio spectrum frequencies on an interna-
tional level.39
The purpose of the ITU as of 19474 was to "coordinate efforts with
a view to harmonize the development of telecommunications facilities,
34 See, eg., E. MCWHINNEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF COMMUNICATIONS, 11-20
(1971).
35 See Communication Satellite Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-624, § 101-102, 76 Stat. 419 (codi-
fied at 47 U.S.C. § 701 (1982)).
36 Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (IN-
TELSAT), August 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813, 3814, T.I.A.S. No. 7532 [hereinafter INTELSAT
Agreement].
37 See Pan Am Satellite Corp., 101 F.C.C.2d 1318, 1336 (1985); RCA Am. Comm., Inc., 101
F.C.C.2d 1342, 1356 (1985).
38 See Note, A Search in the Heavens Should INTELSTATBe Subject to US. Antitrust Laws?,
24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 133 (1985).
39 International Telecommunications Convention, Oct. 25, 1973, art. IV, 28 U.S.T. 2495, 2512,
T.I.A.S. No. 8572.
40 E.W. PLOMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMA-
TION 227 (1982).
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notably those using space techniques, with a view to full advantage being
taken of their possibilities."'"
The preamble to the INTELSAT definitive agreement declares the
goal of INTELSAT "a single global commercial telecommunication sat-
ellite system"4 2 seeming to approve the creation of a monopoly such as
COMSAT. The definitive agreement goes on to emphasize the necessity
for "the provision on a commercial basis of the space segment required
for international public telecommunication services of high quality and
reliability to be available on a non-discriminatory basis to all areas of the
world."43 Just these two quotes raise interesting issues. First of all, the
provision of a "single global commercial telecommunications" system
may in reality conflict with the goal of assuring availability of satellite
communications on a nondiscriminatory basis to all areas of the world.
Furthermore, providing high quality services on a nondiscriminatory
basis is in reality a more ambitious proposal than simply allowing
equal access. What are the factors to be considered in evaluating
whether or not a transnational communications system is truly non-
discriminatory?'
There is a limited amount of space in which a given number of satel-
lites can operate in the geosynchronous orbit where most communication
satellites lie.4" This means that technologically less developed countries
or those without the financial means to put satellites in space are
threatened with the loss of the possibility of participation in the system in
the future.
While the U.S. has strongly supported INTELSAT,46 it has gener-
ally opposed U.N. proposals and resolutions calling for regulations that
would limit access to or redistribution of limited geosynchronous re-
sources.4" Furthermore, in all U.N. and UNESCO discussions about
communications and information technology, the U.S.'s strongest sup-
port has always been for the principle of a free flow of information which
41 International Telecommunications Convention, supra note 39 at 2512.
42 INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 36, at 3814.
43 Id. at 3819.
44 "Non-discriminatory" is not actually defined in the definitive agreement, and thus must be
elucidated by its context in the agreement which expresses a concern for availability to "all areas of
the world."
45 Note, Orbital Saturation: the Necessity for International Regulation of Geosynchronous
Orbits, 9 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 139, 141 (1979).
46 The Soviet system INTERSPUTNIK was formed when the USSR refused to join INTEL-
SAT because of the strong ownership presence of COMSAT, the U.S. signatory. Note, Bypassing
INTELSAT. Fair Competition or Violation of the INTELSAT Agreement?, 8 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
479, 484 (1985).
47 See, e.g., Rein, McDonald, Adams, Frank & Nielsen, Implementation of a U.S. "Free Entry"
Initiative for Transatlantic Satellite Facilities: Problems, Pitfalls and Possibilities, 18 GEO. WAsH. J.
L. & ECON. 459 (1985).
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precludes such practices are prior consent or cooperation with any other
country's policy or mechanisms for limiting or screening the broadcasts
into that country.48
In attempting to resolve disputes about how communications, satel-
lite resources and information should be regulated, the means which
U.N. resolutions have consistently employed to acknowledge and at-
tempt to give fair play to the tremendous diversity of national legislation
and underlying philosophy dealing with communications and informa-
tion has been to incorporate by reference a number of principles - i.e.
sovereignty, free exchange, equal access, and fair distribution of limited
resources.49 Obviously, these principles may, when put into practice,
come into conflict. They may, however, imply no more conflict than that
which is engendered and often resolved on the domestic context, by, for
example, in the United States, a whole body of information and commu-
nications law including copyright law, first amendment doctrine, and
technological and communications regulatory law. One task is to ex-
amine what kind of conflict is inevitably incited when the fundamental
principles are invoked by the UNESCO resolution and in other equally
international debates. This kind of study will not so much identify a
place from which to begin to formulate an international communications
law but rather one from which to decide what the limits are to creating a
cohesive body of law out of inherently conflicting interests and
principles.
The U.N. resolutions set forth the fundamental concerns which are
raised again and again in international debates about regulation of trans-
national communication. How far apart the participants can be in their
expectations, requirements or the contents of the principles affecting in-
ternational communications practices while at the same time they can
agree on the basic concerns articulated in the resolutions is well docu-
mented by one dispute in which the U.S. stood against all other mem-
bers.5 0 The Soviet Union had submitted a draft agreement to the general
assembly which proposed certain controls over satellite broadcasting and
included a prior consent agreement by the receiving country and substan-
tial limitations on the content of broadcast transmitted by satellite.51
48 See Crawford, Toward an Information Age Debate in CHRON. INT'L CoM. 3 (1980).
49 34 U.N. GAOR (107th plen. mtg.) para. 100, U.N. Doc. A/34/PV.107 (1979); U.N. Doe.
A/AC.105/337 Annex I at 12-13 (1984).
50 U.N. Doc. A/A.C. 105/127 (1974).
51 U.N. Doe. A/8771 (1972). One commentator claims that the disagreements among U.N.
signatories when it comes to drafting anything more specific than a list of general concerns affecting
communications practices stem from a fundamental, perhaps unresolvable, difference in attitude to-
wards, not the function of freedom of communication, but even more basic the definition or role of
international cooperation generally: "The West believes that increased cooperation automatically
leads to appeasement [or security]; the East considers that increased security leads gradually to
cooperation." Martelane, T. "The third basket", in Helsinki and Belgrade. Intermedia 5 No. 5
1990]
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The Soviet proposal asked for prohibition of several kinds of broadcasts,
including: (a) broadcasts detrimental to the maintenance of international
peace and security; (b) broadcasts representing interference in intra-state
affairs of any kind; (c) broadcasts involving an encroachment on funda-
mental human rights, on the dignity and worth of a human person, and
on fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, lan-
guage or religion; (d) broadcasts propagandizing violence, horrors, por-
nography, and the use of narcotics; (e) broadcasts undermining "the
foundations of the local civilization, culture, way of life, traditions or
language"; (f) broadcasts which misinform the public on these and other
matters. 52 These categories were later reformulated in a provision which
asked the member states to prohibit satellite broadcasts which would
publicize [ ] ideas of war, militarism, national and racial hatred and
enmity between peoples, which is aimed at interfering in the internal
domestic affairs of other States, or which undermines the foundations
of the local civilization, culture, way of life, traditions or language.53
The United States stood on first amendment principles in opposing the
proposal in any of its versions. A subcommittee was constituted to dis-
cuss the irreconcilable issues that had been raised by the proposal. Those
specific issues on which the subcommittee could not reach a consensus
are further indications of the differences in fundamental principles ad-
hered to by member nations. The requirement of obtaining consent for
any broadcast from a recipient nation could not be formulated in terms
that were acceptable to all the members.54 Alternatives were proposed
which covered the range from requiring consent to all broadcasts aimed
at a foreign nation to an alternative in which consent was not required
but cooperation between the states encouraged.55 Also, content regula-
tion was an area in which the subcommittee was unable to reach a con-
sensus to offer to the general assembly. The alternatives in the area of
content regulation ranged from the requirement that member states
should cooperate with each other with respect to program content to a
proposal which reiterated the specific prohibited matters which the So-
viet proposal sought to prohibit.56 A conclusion to be drawn from the
sub-committee's report was that no compromise would be possible on the
principles of prior consent and content control.
(1977). While the East-West dichotomy may not, in practical fact, be as stark today as it was in
1977 the basic contradictions in the principles to which nations appeal in their attempts to construct
an international communication law remain.
52 U.N. Doc. A/8771 (1972); U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/127 Annex II at 2 (1974). Parts (a), (b),
and (e) of the Soviet Proposal were incorporated into article IV of the 1974 version.
53 Id..
54 Id. at 14.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 17.
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VI. A NEW APPROACH: LOOKING BEYOND IRRECONCILABLE
PRINCIPLES TO FIND SHARED INTERESTS
The purpose of this article is not to advocate increased restriction on
or regulation of transnational communications under international law.
Rather, it is to propose a procedure or approach under which a topic,
international information exchange on transnational communications,
the consideration of which has frequently led to an impasse on issues of
principle, can be more substantively discussed.
In view of the U.N. Subcommittee's failure to arrive at any consen-
sus on the issues raised in the Soviet proposal, it is interesting to recall
the extent to which the NOAA Act constituted both a version of prior
consent and content control. Indeed, many F.C.C. practices and codes
are compatible with content-oriented regulations on an international
scale. Certainly, the F.C.C. does not hide its interest in regulating broad-
casts which contain or promote violence, pornography, matters consid-
ered to be a poor influence on children, and advertising in certain areas
such as tobacco and alcohol.57
Is there any consistency to the U.S. unmitigated opposition to pro-
posals, even when vaguely formulated, for content regulation or prior
consent, and its own practice of allowing a complexity of regulations on
communication under first amendment law? Certainly, it is not always
the case that the first amendment would be inconsistent with regulation
of transnational messages or the flow of information in an international
realm. For example, regulation of advertising or restraints on defama-
tory or obscene broadcasts would be quite consistent with established
U.S. doctrine.
There has been no lack of discussion of the ideological or philosoph-
ical issues raised by the U.N. resolutions and other attempts to regulate
transnational communication. In general, the law review articles recapit-
ulate the U.N. debate by discussing the issues around which potential
member parties to the resolution break down. 8 These issues are gener-
ally denominated by: individual rights, the free flow of information, na-
tional sovereignty, noninterference, avoidance of conflict, prior consent,
protection for developing nations, national security, and recognition of
"common heritage" all of which have been examined again and again as
the background to competing concepts which affect negotiations over
resolutions concerning transnational satellite communications. 9 One
can continue to debate the same principles and recapitulate the same im-
57 See, e.g., Inquiry Into Alleged Broadcast and Cable Casts of Obscene, Indecent or Profane
Material by Licensees, Permittees, or Cable Systems, 40 F.C.C. 2d 105 (1973); Broadcasting in
America and the F.C.C.'s License Renewal Process, 14 F.C.C. 2d 1 (1968).
58 See infra note 59.
59 See, eg., Powell, supra note 32. D'Arcy, Broadcasting in the Global Age, 43 COMBROAD 2
1990]
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passes. Instead of disagreeing about the fundamental and irrevocable
principles this new approach, and one which may be helpful not only on
the international level but also in the formulation of domestic communi-
cations law, particularly the regulations like the NOAA Act, would be to
just what it is about communication itself which is valuable to all the
participants seeking to negotiate an international agreement. Perhaps,
the problem is not so much that one party or another will not agree to
any mechanism of restrain, for example, advertising or certain kinds of
propaganda, but, rather, that the member will not agree to compromise a
particular principle. The point is that, in reality, one practice may be
consistent with two inconsistent principles.6" An approach which has
not been pursued and which in fact may allow the nations to arrive at an
articulation of compatible rules interests rather than remaining at the
level of debating incompatible principles is to ask what precisely are the
properties of communication which are essential to an efficient interna-
tional communications system. If those fundamental properties are ar-
ticulated, one might then be able to move from those features to the
creation of rules which stand the chance of being consistent with uncom-
promisable principles. The following is an example of the properties of
communication which would have to be taken into account: Communica-
tion as a commodity - communication products and means have a
worth; this worth can be exchanged; losing it or enhancing it has a cost
or value. Communication as a method of establishing and negotiating re-
lationships - forms of communication and results of communication are
the basis for relationships between organizations and between individu-
als. As such, they must be protected and allowed to exist and continue.
Interference in them can interfere with relationships or change or dam-
age parties to those relationships. Communication as a resource - com-
munication means and their results may be scarce, limited or infinite
depending upon the mechanism and other practical facts such as cost,
(1979). Price, The First Amendment and Television Broadcasting by Satellite, 23 UCLA L. REV. 879
(1976).
60 A good example is noted by Karjala and Sugiyama in their comparative study of Japanese
and American Copyright Law:
[M]any apparent differences in analytical style between Japanese and American judges
can be reconciled by focusing on the results of the cases rather than the actual language
used to justify those results. This is particularly true in the standards for determining
infringement. In America, the almost uniform judicial litany is that copying is proved by
access plus substantial similarity and that infringement is determined by substantial simi-
larity of protected elements. In Japan, the verbal formulations of the standards for in-
fringement are much more vague and show greater variety, but one cannot say ... the
results [of the] Japanese courts are consistently more or less protective of copyright than
those of the United States.
Karjala & Sugiyama, Fundamental Concepts in Japanese and American Copyright Law, 36 Am. J.
COMP. L. 613, 678 (1988).
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the state of technology affecting transmission and storage, etc. As such,
the regulation of the communication may have to respond to changes in
the status of communication as a resource in the same way that regula-
tion of energy responds to changes in supply and technology. Communi-
cation as a form of human behavior - communication is a means of self-
expression and of creation; it allows for the expression of one's personal-
ity, desires, frustrations and humanity. While as a "form of human be-
havior" or of self-expression, it may be considered as an end in itself it is
only one end of the individual.
If we consider regulations of communication in the international
sphere from the perspective of what communication is rather than what
irreconcilable principles any regulation of it must acknowledge, we may
find a way of arriving at rules that, because they fit actual facts also are
compatible with the principles at stake. Chafee's famous statement about
balancing expresses the value of this approach:
Or to put the matter another way, it is useless to define free speech
by talk about rights. The agitator asserts his constitutional right to
speak, the government asserts its constitutional right to wage war. The
result is a deadlock .... To find the boundary line of any right, we
must get behind rules of law to human facts. In our problem, we must
regard the desires and needs of the individual human being who wants
to speak and those of the great group of human beings among whom
he speaks. That is, in technical language, there are individual interests
and social interests, which must be balanced against each other, if they
conflict, in order to determine which interest shall be sacrificed under
the circumstances and which shall be protected and become the foun-
dation of a legal right. It must never be forgotten that the balancing
cannot be properly done unless all the interests involved are adequately
ascertained, and the great evil of all this talk about rights is that each
side is so busy denying the other's claim to rights that it entirely over-
looks the human desires and needs behind that claim.6 1
The reason that this is the appropriate time and the international
realm the appropriate context for (re)considering the facts of communi-
cation and avoiding a debate over long-established principles is that with
new technologies for communication enabling a more rapid and denser
flow of information and at the same time making the control of informa-
tion much more difficult, it may make sense to regulate certain forms of
communication because of their power, pervasiveness, and interference
- to an extent to which the regulation of less intrusive technologies such
as print would be a violation of constitutional protections or human
rights. One need only think of the degree to which the electronic collec-
tion and processing of information has diminished individual privacy to
61 Z. CHAFEE, supra note 4, at 31.
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understand that uniform application of broad principles about freedom
of speech will have very different consequences depending on the nature
of the media to which they are applied. As certain new technologies
significantly expand the volume, the reach and the speed of the spread of
information breaking down boundaries between individual and state and
between states the task of the courts, of the U.N., of other international
communications law-makers will be to trace the limits on controls of in-
formation in accord with our developing faculties for gathering, storing
and transmitting information. The goal should be to make sure that the
important properties of communication, such as those suggested above
are not lost and also that other important properties of the individual and
important values are not sacrificed in an unexamined application of sa-
cred principles to shifting technologies.
